Kant's Critique of the Power of Judgment is often interpreted in light of its initial reception. Conventionally, this reception is examined in the work of Fichte, Schelling and Hegel, who found in Kant's third Critique a new task for philosophy: the construction of an absolute, self-grounding system. This paper identifies an alternative line of reception in the work of physiologists and medical practitioners during the 1790s and early 1800s, including Kielmeyer, Reil, Girtanner and Oken. It argues that these naturalists called on Kant's third Critique to solidify an experimental natural history that classifies organic form within system of laws. Kant held both kinds of system in tension, which is why the third Critique remains a singular and provocative text.
Introduction
Kant's Critique of the Power of Judgment is often interpreted in light of its initial reception in the 1790s and early 1800s. 1 In The Twenty-Five Years of Philosophy, Eckert Förster describes this period as one of the most productive -if not the most productive -in philosophical history. 2 In Förster's reconstruction, Kant's third Critique outlines a passage from reason to nature by means of a negative representation of the understanding's capacity to legislate nature according to the a priori principles of judgment. It thereby provides the scaffolding for a philosophical system capable of grounding itself on a principle immanent to its own operation. 3 While practically none of Kant's successors felt that his project had succeeded, they nevertheless saw the construction of a complete, self-grounding system as the basic task of philosophy. 4 Sebastian Gardner provides a similar account of the third Critique's reception as follows:
the CPJ exerted its greatest influence by a long chalk in the immediate Kantian aftermath on the German Idealists, who regarded it as the most important of the three Critiques -not of course in a sense that would imply its independence from the others, but in so far as they took it to set the agenda for what philosophy after Kant should do, or put another way, which for them came to the same thing, what should be done with Kant's philosophy. 5 The interpretation of Kant's third Critique presented by Gardner is characterized by what I will call absolute systematicity, the establishment of a complete philosophical system. While Kant argues that the discursive nature of cognition entails that freedom and nature are present to us from two discontinuous standpoints, the German Idealists identified in the third Critique -and in § §76-77 in particular -a quasi-speculative account of intuition for which reason and nature cohere as a system of final ends. On this interpretation, the entire thrust of the analytic of the beautiful and the antinomy of the teleological power of judgment is to exhibit our reflective capacity to represent a non-discursive intellect for which nature is intuited as both ordered and free.
The reconstruction presented by Förster and Gardner identifies a productive tension in Kant's third Critique between discursive cognition and judgment's capacity to operate beyond the limits of the understanding. Yet this was not the only way the text was received in the immediate Kantian aftermath. The goal of this paper is to identify an alternative line of reception in the work of physiologists and clinical practitioners working in medical departments across Germany in the 1790s and early 1800s, including Karl Friedrich Kielmeyer, Johann Christian Reil, Christoph Girtanner and Lorenz Oken. These naturalists viewed Kant's project in the third Critique as necessarily incomplete, for it casts the task of harmonization as a matter of empirical research. This line of interpretation is characterized by what I will call of experimental systematicity, for it identifies in Kant's third Critique a programme of research grounded on the assumption that organic structure features within nature as a system of laws. While the discursive nature of cognition means that the naturalist cannot construct a complete natural system, reflective judgment enables the naturalist to conduct empirical research within a projected and yet unknown natural system. If we follow the experimental systematists, the achievement of the third Critique is to harmonize the metaphysics of nature Kant developed in the first Critique and Metaphysical Foundations with empirical nature, thereby opening a scientific framework for classification.
The experimental systematists have received far less attention in the literature than the philosophers normally associated with the Kant to Hegel picture. For historians of philosophy, their focus on embryology, reproduction and comparative physiology seems too empirical to be of interest. For historians of the biological sciences, their work is 'an unfortunate era dominated by arid speculation', as Timothy Lenoir puts it. 6 In most histories of pre-Darwinian biology, Kielmeyer, Reil, Girtanner and Oken are viewed within the romantic tradition of Naturphilosophie, which presents nature as a global organism. In contrast to this view, I argue that -with the exception of Oken -they explicitly opposed Naturphilosophie and sought to identify an alternative theoretical basis for physiology and natural history in Kant's third Critique. Their appeal to Kant served to distance their work from the Naturphilosophen, who were seen as transgressing the experimental limits of natural history. 7 This paper is primarily concerned with historical understanding. Both lines of reception, I suggest, provide a deeper grasp of Kant's project in the third Critique by highlighting the alternative standpoints made possible by reflective judgment. Each demonstrates a particular strategy of vindicating the critical project, and yet each found it necessary to go beyond the boundaries Kant tried to maintain between determinative and reflective judgment. The first aims to ground the unity of reason on a fundamental principle, the second aims to build a system of laws. Kant sought to hold both kinds of system in tension, which is why the third Critique remains a singular and provocative text.
A Göttingen school?
A common feature that unites Kielmeyer, Reil, Girtanner and Oken is that each naturalist, at some stage of his career, came into contact with Johann Blumenbach's lectures on physiology and natural history in the medical department at Göttingen. Noting this commonality, Lenoir identifies a 'Göttingen school' of physiology united by a shared commitment the scientific conception of natural history shared by Kant and Blumenbach. This conception of natural history, according to Lenoir, was based on a 'teleomechanist research programme' that enabled the development of transcendental morphology at the turn of the nineteenth century. 8 Lenoir's claim is not that Kant's successors followed the methodological approach to organic systems outlined in Critique of the Power of Judgment as some kind of programmatic textbook but rather that Kant 'set forth a clear synthesis of the principal elements of an emerging consensus among biologists.' While Lenoir's proposal has significantly increased our understanding of this period of history by bringing the neglected work of the so-called Göttingen school to the attention of historians of science, in what follows I provide an alternative account.
The Göttingen connection, I suggest, is in some senses arbitrary; Kielmeyer spent only a year under Blumenbach's tuition, and Oken arrived after receiving his education in Würzburg, and was critical of Blumenbach from the start of his tenure. 9 More significantly, there is little textual evidence to support Lenoir's reading of
Blumenbach as the figurehead of a teleomechanist programme of research based on
Kant's natural history. 10 Alternatively, I suggest that while this group of naturalists were clearly influenced by Blumenbach's natural history, they were critical of his failure to resolve the tension between the mechanistic interpretation of Newtonianism and the vitalist account of the Lebenskraft offered by the Naturphilosophen. To find a solution they drew from the transcendental structure of Kant's natural history, which does not ground experimental inquiry on facts about nature but rather on the structure of cognition. On my account, the joining thread of the physiologists and medical practitioners interested in Kant's third Critique was a methodological form of vitalism that maintained a creative tension between the discursive nature of cognition and the ideal of a completed system. Before turning to this interpretation of Kant, it is important to begin with a brief sketch of Blumenbach's conception of natural history. Blumenbach studied medicine at both Jena and Göttingen during the 1770s, where he came to know several of the founding figures of the Romantic Movement along with some of the most innovative medical practitioners of his day. 11 His dissertation 'On the Natural Varieties of Human Beings' (1775) was widely read, and gained him the status of Privatdozent at Göttingen. His work grew rapidly in influence, and within three years he had advanced to ordinary professor. 12 Textual evidence suggests that Blumenbach began to consider Kant's philosophy in 1786 as a result of the dispute stemming from Kant's reviews of Herder's 'Ideas for a Philosophy of the History of Mankind' and Kant's exchange with Georg Forster. 13 The dispute concerned the epistemic status the formative force by which we can examine the development of organic form across time. While Herder presented the formative force as the hypothetical ground of natural phenomena though an analogy with Newton's account of gravity, Kant sought to qualify the formative force as a regulative principle that governs our search for affinity in nature (see RHI 8:62).
In Über den Bildungstrieb, Blumenbach presents this formative force as a drive responsible for organic effects. Like Herder he conceives of the Bildubgstrieb through an analogy with Newton's gravitational force. Yet in contrast to Herder, he does not present the drive as a fundamental force that unites the totality of natural products in a universal natural history. Blumenbach seems to have agreed with Kant that such an account would merely assume what was meant to be discovered. Rather, he presents the Bildungstrieb as a programmatic hypothesis that enables the naturalist to examine the regularity of organic functions through experiment and observation:
Hopefully it is unnecessary to remind most readers that the word Bildungstrieb, like the words attraction, gravity etc., should serve no more and no less than to signify a force [Kraft] whose constant effect is recognised from experience, and whose cause, like the causes of the aforementioned widely recognised natural powers, is for us an qualitas occulta. 14 Blumenbach presents his account of the Bildungstrieb as a postulated force that shares the hypothetical status of Newton's gravity. Here Blumenbach builds not on Herder's universal natural history but on Albrecht von Haller's physiological method, which, in Blumenbach's words, 'begins as usual with the thing with which one denies the status of truth; and there, one harvests at long last that which possessed a mere honorific status, and one can now say, "that is what we have long been acquainted with!"' 15 To examine the properties of organised beings, Haller proposed that the naturalist follows Newton's procedure by positing an unknown faculty as X, and then seeks to discover its value without speculating in regards to its cause. 16 Just as the hypothetical postulation of a force enabled Newton to discover the laws governing celestial dynamics, the Bildungstrieb enables the naturalist 'to give closer determination to 
Kielmeyer's physics of the animal kingdom
In a lecture given at the Hohen Karlsschule in 1793, Über die Verhältniße der organischen Kräfte, Kielmeyer outlines a new method for natural history that seeks to classify the organic world as a 'series of organisations [Reihe der Organisationen].' 21 Kielmeyer takes up the methodological idea assumed by Blumenbach and Kant that the scala naturae provides a hypothesis that enables the naturalist to go looking for the forces that enable the logical connections that hold in one's model. For Kielmeyer, such forces regulate the distribution of vital functions throughout the animal kingdom.
These laws mark out a 'Physik der Tierreichs' discovered through comparative anatomical studies among animals. The goal of natural history is to systematise and unify the patterns by which form has unfolded to find common relations that give rise to general laws.
Kielmeyer presents his programme of research as a new method of classification grounded on experimental methodology. In Blumenbach's account of the Bildungstrieb, the naturalist is able to discover the laws governing organic form by following Newton's method of positing an X as the unknown force responsible for organic effects. Yet Blumenbach failed to distinguish this procedure from the discovery of the universal laws of nature, which means that the limits of mechanistic 22 This account required modifications, however; for Kielmeyer, the capacity to identify some objects as living beings is not a matter of reflection that arises once determinant judgment has failed to provide sufficient determination. Rather, the examination of organic structure is a matter of the schematising understanding:
If we, by the power of our minds, separate the phenomena of nature -for us connected in a system by space and time -for their connection, then surely those appearances that we isolate and subsume under the name 'animate nature', I mean the organisations of our earth, are the most able to fill us with feelings of nature's greatness of those with which we are closely acquainted.
To be sure, no masses, volumes, or distances found here are like those of the skies, by which nature convinces us of its greatness. However, if, when judging the greatness of an object, we can deign to give voice and listen with a little patience to the multiplicity [Vielheit], manifoldness [Mannigfaltigheit] and harmony [Harmonie] of effects in a small space and short periods of time, then there are things of another kind, that speak to us no less forcefully. 23 In this passage Kielmeyer extends the idea of an organised system to the entire biosphere. The idea is that the manifold of nature is presented to us in intuition within a spatio-temporal system, which is then schematised by the understanding. This system is not determined by particular laws; it is rather amenable to the determination of possible laws, for the understanding, in Kant's view, is not concerned with 'the totality of connections' but with the sensibly given manifold, which it seeks to structure as classificatory and causal (B164). To provide further determination, we separate the phenomena to discern the particular grounds of their connection. While naturalists traditionally turn to the ordered movement of celestial spheres as the greatest example of the capacity of reason to order the cognitions of the understanding, Kielmeyer invites his listeners to turn instead to the independently structured multiplicity of the organic sphere, and to discern the harmony of effects and causes that speak to us of another kind of order. First, this leads us to note the incredible diversity of forms on the surface of the earth, which is an extremely small space compared to the planetary system. Second, this leads us to note the how these things occupy time: the changes that an organism undergoes results in the reciprocal adaptation of all the other organs, thus forming a system that is so united that 'each is reciprocally cause and effect of the other.' 24 This same configuration characterises the organisms within a species, and the organisms within an environmental system, which come together to 'form the life of the great machine of the organic world.' 25 Kielmeyer's temporal portrayal of the part-whole relationship that governs organic structure clearly builds on Kant's account of organic form. However, his consideration of the organic sphere as a counterpart to celestial dynamics places the study of animate nature on the same footing as mechanical nature. This move shifts the study of particular organised beings, which Kant reserved for the historical doctrine of nature, to the domain Kant described as experimental physics (MF 4:468).
Animate nature for Kielmeyer is not firstly a matter of reflective judgment but of intuition; it occupies space as an unfathomable manifold, in the same way as nonliving nature, and yet it occupies time in a fundamentally different manner: as a reciprocal relation of cause and effect, where the effect can also be understood as grounds for the cause. The system of the organic world is not made present through the symbolic equivalent to the schematism, as Kant had argued in the third Critique, which transposes the form of rational agency into a symbol for the reflective application of judgment (CPJ 5:352). Rather, animate nature for Kielmeyer is schematised by the understanding. Yet the judicial structure of animate nature is not fixed, for the system changes itself in time as natural history. The universal principle that structures animate nature as a unity is the 'law of compensation
[Kompensationsgesetz]', by which each part self-regulates in dynamic relation to all the other parts. 26 Such a principle cannot simply be a matter of the understanding, which operates according to laws that are universal and necessary, but also of reason, for it concerns the capacity of organised beings to respond to environmental conditions according to an inner principle of change. Kielmeyer's goal is thus to systematise and unify the patterns by which form has unfolded to find common relations that give rise to general laws, thereby providing a scientific foundation for the system of nature. While the constitutive causes of organic nature cannot be grasped, nature must be examined as if it exhibited a technique analogous to purposeful action:
we still must confess that the chain of effects and causes in most cases seems like a chain of means and ends to us and that we would find it advantageous for our reason to assume such a chain. 27 As Richards notes, Kielmeyer frames his claim in such a way that nature might not have intrinsic purposes, and that the search for higher goals might ultimately appear to be illusory. 28 The success of the research program would however provide evidence that such a system does track an order in nature. The lecture demonstrates To grasp what defines this program as an experimental science, we need to return to the first Critique's Architectonic of Pure Reason. There Kant argues that 'systematic unity is that which first makes ordinary cognition into a science, i.e. It is no accident that Kant calls on an organic metaphor to elucidate reason's systematicity. The systematic structure of rational cognition is not the result of a mechanical process, it is not fixed, and neither is it an artefact produced by a designer.
Rather, the growth of a rational system is internal and enhances the proper functioning of its parts. Natural science forms a part of this system to the extent that it tells us what nature is from the theoretical standpoint, that is, as ruled by the legislation of the understanding. What Kant calls the 'metaphysics of nature' reveals the principles of physics (i.e. special metaphysics), which govern the application of mathematics to appearances.
Yet the project Kielmeyer pursues is not one of natural science as the study of the rules of the understanding, but rather the construction of a natural system of empirical laws. This is where the third Critique comes into play. If we follow This problem, Kant informs us, concerns the division between the theoretical and the practical spheres. This is not the problem of harmonizing nature and freedom in a philosophical system, however, but harmonizing them for the sake of experimental research. On the one hand, the theoretical sphere concerns propositions that determine experience according to the laws of nature, providing a conception of nature as an aggregate of appearances in time and space. On the other hand, the practical sphere concerns propositions that give law, and thus concern only the possibility of a represented object (through voluntary action). Thus a practical physics is an absurdity, for our construction of physical models is the pure consequence of a theory. Yet Kant notes that there is a practical part to physics insofar as it rests on empirical principles.
In the First Introduction Kant calls such an investigation 'experimental physics' (FI 20:198), which proceeds not 'mechanically' but 'technically' in order to discover the 'hidden laws of nature'. An experimental physics is 'practical' to the extent that it assumes that nature is the product of reasoned activity, and yet, unlike practical reason, it does not constitute what it represents. Rather, it searches for order within the manifold of appearances. Kant describes the process as follows:
Now it is clear that the reflecting power of judgment, given its nature, could not undertake to classify the whole of nature according to its empirical differences if it did not presuppose that nature itself specifies its transcendental laws in accordance with some sort of principle. Now this principle can be none other than that of the suitability of the capacity of the power of judgment experience of this in all its multiplicity and for research into it' (CPJ 5:185). With this presupposition in place we are able to credit some of our empirical generalizations with a necessary status by virtue of their incorporation in a system that is constructed by following certain rules that are necessary. Kant states that we consider such statements 'as rules, (i.e., as necessary), because otherwise they would not constitute an order of nature, even though it does not and never can cognize their necessity' (CPJ 5:185). The idea is that as our discursive representation gains in systematicity we can claim that it tracks reality as given to an intuitive intellect. The absolute limitation is reflected in the necessity of employing concepts that cannot be taken to determine an object but rather serve as formal rules.
Kielmeyer's address conveys a direct reference to Kant's argument, for it argues that forces must be regarded as teleological principles that distinguish organisms from non-living matter. We must assume a Bildungstrieb as the organizational principle of each organized body so that we can go about classifying if appearances in outer sense are the effects of matter in motion, then the representation of organic beings cannot be a mere matter of inner sense but 'must be grounded in the spatial, in matter.' 32 The 'doctrine of nature [Naturlehre]', he states, 'is the science of the qualities of things in the world of sense.' 33 Living and dead matter can be separated according to their qualities, just as vegetable and animal matter can again be separated. Matter alone for Reil simply cannot determine a priori the variety of natural bodies, for if that were so, 'there would be no necessity for employing the concept of Kraft.' 34 Consider the case of generation: how the seed (Keim) or stem (Stamm) originally arose, how it formed, and whether it contains the entire organic individual in miniature or only a part, this 'we do not know'. 35 Yet we can proceed by searching for affinity within the world of sense on the assumption that a seed is there to be found. Reil cites Kant's account of the natural end, and agrees that we must consider organisms as individuals in which each part is related to the other reciprocally as means and ends. 36 Yet his language suggests that he understood the organising force as a causal relation established by cognition. He argues that 'each part forms itself and maintains itself through its own energy', suggesting that the connection each part holds with the others is the result of this energy rather than a manifestation of it. 37 Both interpretations find in Kant's account of reflective judgment a ladder that allows us to climb from the metaphysics of nature to nature as a system of laws even though such a system is not (yet) available to us. The first stresses the speculative view from the top: by judging nature as a self-organizing system, thereby completing the absolute system, we can then investigate empirical laws. 40 The second stresses the experimental view from the ground: we search for empirical laws along the guiding lines set forth by reflective judgment in order to vindicate our reflective estimation of nature's purposiveness. In this sense both interpretations find in Kant's third Critique a manifesto for an experimental science, which, as Schelling explains in the First Outline, had hitherto been viewed as 'a mongrel idea that implies no consistent thought, or rather, is an idea which cannot be thought at all.' 41 The first pursues this along the lines of Naturphilosophie, the second of a methodological form of vitalism.
In this final section I want to examine the singularity of Kant's project; why it stands apart from other philosophies of nature and how the tensions it captures generate the extensive philosophical energy evinced by interpretations that can be traced back to it. As Philippe Huneman notes, if we were concerned with comparing the philosophical theses of those thinkers at the turn of the nineteenth century interested in transforming natural history into a scientific endeavour, 'one would have to stress Kant's isolation.' 42 As is well-recognised in the literature, any attempt to identify Kant as the father of either German Idealism or biology as a unified science must distort Kant's views on the level of theory. 43 Yet if our history of this period aims rather to compare conceptual lineages opened by creative moments of philosophical synthesis, then we discover in the third Critique an extremely rich collection of problems that remain strikingly relevant to contemporary philosophy. 44 The it were a mathematical truth that they must be divided just as he has divided themnot a word to justify this classification, or about others.' 45 The issue at stake, Oken insists, is how systematicity is justified. In his view, the fundamental task of natural history is to build to a system of comparative physiology on empirical sources that provide a view in miniature of developmental change. 46 His method is not 'to start directly at the origin of the organic world, but rather to go back to the first stirring of the universe, and to let the whole of nature emerge gradually from there.' 47 Of course, Oken was aware that we cannot build an objective history of nature's development.
Kant was charged for presenting a 'science of the gods' by Forster in 1786, which initially motivated his reflective account of judgment in his teleology essay of 1788. 48 During the late 1780s Kant became increasingly aware of the problematic gap between empirical nature and a genuine metaphysics of nature, and sought to provide a way that the natural researcher might transition from one to the other. Yet for Oken, natural history can extend further than the discovery of affinities between fossilized remains and the present diversity of organic life. The task of natural history, as he saw it, is 'to find the universal order within the particular givenness of natural processes.' 49 Kant had claimed that the experimental investigation of empirical objects strives towards a universal understanding of nature; every empirical investigation presupposes that nature 'adheres to a parsimony suitable for our judgment and a uniformity we can grasp' (CPJ 5:213). Oken provides a liberal interpretation of Kant's experimental presentation of systematicty to the extent that he connects description, classification, anatomy, physiology and chemistry into one allencompassing theoretical framework called 'biology'. However, if the basic goal of systematicity is to establish the individual laws of nature as necessarily true, and if the only way this can be achieved is by the integration of these laws into a system, it would seem that systematicity is a condition of the possibility of experience itself.
That is, it would seem that systematicity is on par with the constitutive principles of the understanding. For Oken, the task of the Naturphilosoph is to remove the assimilation of thinking and finite thinking -to adopt the standpoint afforded by Kant's reflective judgment -so that life and thought become one. Goethe presents a similar thought in 'Pure Concepts' (1792):
Because the simpler powers of nature are often hidden from our senses, we must seek to reach out to them though the powers of our mind and to represent their nature in ourselves, for we can not behold them outside ourselves. …
[for] our mind stands in harmony with the deeper lying simpler powers of nature and thus can represent them purely, as we perceive the objects of the visible world with a clear eye. 50 Goethe identifies a deeper confluence between inner and outer sense than Reil had sketched in his reading of Kant. For Kant, while reason looks for the unconditioned the understanding is limited to the series of conditioned effects. This is precisely why reflective judgment can investigate the space between the conditioned and the unconditioned. Yet for Goethe, the organism is a special case, for it leads us toward the speculative thought of the organism's existence as a free natural purpose, even though such an existence must remain inexplicable for the understanding. Goethe saw that Kant's teleological approach to nature provided a way to speak of final causes in nature without invoking a divine artisan in nature's etiology. His notion of metamorphosis defines the process by which the archetype moves through nature with various functions and with frequent changes in form, none of which are preordained but all of which form part of nature as a whole. When 'an organism manifests itself', he claims, we are able to 'grasp the unity and freedom of its formative impulse.' 51 The program of Naturphilosophie developed by Oken, Schelling and Goethe departs from Kant to the extent that it accepts that freedom and nature can be unified without eliminating freedom. The experimental physics of Kielmeyer and Reil oversteps the reflective limits Kant placed on our knowledge of the Lebenkräfte. What both interpretations establish is that Kant's recognition of a third standpoint, one that warrants its own critique, opens an investigative field between the metaphysics of nature and nature understood as an empirical manifold that is neither preestablished nor the product of a divine artisan, but rather an underdetermined field of phenomena that is subject to experimental investigation and systematic reconstruction. Kant continually denied this field equal status with experimental physics on the grounds that we cannot examine historical structural modifications in experience. Yet this restriction stemmed from Kant's unswerving commitment to avoid explanations that lie 'outside the field of the observational doctrine of nature' and belong instead to 'speculative nature' (RHI 8:54). The strategy shared by the absolute and experimental systematists not so much to overcome Kant's limitations as it is to show that we do have evidence within the observational field by which to determine the laws governing the organic sphere. Kant's attempt to hold two seemingly irreconcilable commitments -to nature as an exhaustively determined sphere subject to rigorous scientific analysis and to freedom as the capacity for self-legislation -opened this third standpoint from which we reflect on nature as a whole. His insight is made possible by his recognition that the question of the unity of nature and freedom, and the question of the lawfulness of organic structure, bears on us as humans, not merely as knowers or agents. Kant's third Critique remains a singular and provocative text to the extent that what it means for us as organic creatures to look out upon nature, to
